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12	WOOTEN	, JASON WEISTER, and SAWOLL		
13				
14	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
15				
16	ARIEL ALEXANDER SANCHEZ,	Case No:		
17		Judge:		
18	Plaintiff,	NOTICE OF REMOVAL		
19	r mintin,	NOTICE OF REMOVILE		
20	V.	[Filed concurrently herewith:		
21	CITY OF FONTANA, BRANDON	(1) Certification of Interested Parties.]		
22	NICELY, JACOB RAINEY, JOSEPH	T di dess. j		
23	MORALES, BRANDON			
24	MCCAULLEY, JASON MEISTER, SAMUEL WOOTEN, and DOES 1-10			
	inclusive,			
25	Dafandanta			
26	Defendants.			
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Case 2:24-cv-03460

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TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED COURT:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Defendants City of Fontana, Brandon Nicely, Jacob Rainey, Joseph Morales, Brandon McCaulley, Jason Meister, and Samuel Wooten, hereby remove to this Honorable Court the state-court action described below.

- 1. On March 8, 2024, this action was commended in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Bernardino entitled ARIEL ALEXANDER SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, vs. CITY OF FONTANA, OFFICERS BRANDON NICELY, JACOB RAINEY, JOSEPH MORALES, BRANDON MCCAULLEY, JASON MEISTER, SAMUEL WOOTEN, and DOES 1 through 10, INCLUSIVE, Defendants. The suit was assigned case number CIV SB 2402219 by the San Bernardino County Superior Court. A true and correct copy of the Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
- The first date upon which Defendants received a copy of said 2. Complaint was March 28, 2024, when a copy of the Complaint was served on the City Clerk's Office along with a Summon from the State Court. A true and correct copy of the state court Summons is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
- Along with the Summons and Complaint, Defendants also received the 3. following documents from Plaintiff: Certificate of Assignment; Civil Case Cover Sheet; Notice of Trial Setting Conference and Notice of Case Assignment; and Initial Trial Setting Conference Statement, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "C". The Summons, Complaint, and the above-listed documents are the only papers that have been served on Defendants City of Fontana, Brandon Nicely, Jacob Rainey, Joseph Morales, Brandon McCaulley, Jason Meister, and Samuel Wooten in the state court action. To the best of the undersigned's knowledge, these are the only papers filed with the state court.
- This action is a civil action in which this Court has original jurisdiction 4. under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) in that it arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. at PP 31-37.

1 Concurrent with the filing of this Notice of Removal, a Notice to State 5. 2 Court and Adverse Party of Removal to Federal Court is being filed with the state 3 court and served on Plaintiff's counsel. A true and correct copy of that Notice with 4 proof of service thereof is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". 5 6 Dated: April 26, 2024 JONES MAYER 7 By: /s/Denise L. Rocawich 8 James R. Touchstone 9 Denise L. Rocawich 10 Danielle J. Williams Attorneys for Defendants 11 City of Fontana, Brandon Nicely, Jacob Rainey, Joseph Morales, Brandon Mccaulley, 12 Jason Meister, And Samuel Wooten 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -3-

EXHIBIT A

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

Document 1 Filed 04/26/24

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Case 2:24-cv-03460

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF ARIEL ALEXANDER SANCHEZ, and alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

This case presents a stark example of police officers engaging in violent and unlawful conduct with the sole objective of inflicting pain and instilling fear. At least four of the individual defendants piled up on the plaintiff after he had been tackled on a hard asphalt surface. They twisted and contorted his arm in a painful and unnatural position, purposefully dislocating of his elbow. They broke his kneecap and repeatedly punched him in the back of the head while he was lying prone on the ground, not resisting and objectively defenseless. Then, despite his obvious pain and need for immediate medical treatment which they had occasioned, they let him languish in the back of a police cruiser for at least 45 minutes before driving him to a hospital. Plaintiff had committed no crime, and Defendants had no reasonable suspicion that he did. Instead, they did all of this to Plaintiff ostensibly so that he may learn to not "pull away from the cops"—i.e., to refrain from exercising his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Then in order to cover up their misdeeds, and in further violations of Plaintiff's civil rights, they falsely alleged in their reports that Plaintiff resisted arrest.

I. PARTIES

1. At all times mentioned herein, defendant CITY OF FONTANA (hereinafter, "CITY") was a public entity duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of California. The CITY has a clear and present duty to follow California and United States law. See, e.g., Cal. Const. Art. III § 3.5. Upon information and belief, the CITY oversees the Fontana Police Department. The CITY is sued both in its own capacity pursuant to *Monell*, 436 U.S. 658, and *Shaw v. State of California Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control*, 788 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1986), and on the basis of respondeat superior under Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

2. At all times relevant herein, defendants BRANDON NICELY, JACOB RAINEY, JOSEPH MORALES, BRANDON MCCAULLEY, JASON MEISTER, SAMUEL WOOTEN were police

officers of defendant CITY OF FONTANA, and employees of defendant CITY OF FONTANA,

and said defendants were acting within the course and scope of their employment as police officers of the CITY OF FONTANA, which is liable in respondeat superior pursuant to section 815.2 of the California Government Code for the acts of said defendants which are alleged herein.

- 3. Defendants BRANDON NICELY, JACOB RAINEY, JOSEPH MORALES, BRANDON MCCAULLEY, JASON MEISTER, SAMUEL WOOTEN and DOE defendants 1 through 10, are sued here in their official capacity and in their individual capacity.
- 4. At all times relevant herein, defendants BRANDON NICELY, JACOB RAINEY, JOSEPH MORALES, BRANDON MCCAULLEY, JASON MEISTER, SAMUEL WOOTEN and DOE defendants 1 through 10, and each of them, were also acting under color of law, to wit, under the color of the applicable state and federal laws and statutes, as well as ordinances, regulations, policies, customs, and usages of defendant CITY OF FONTANA.
- 5. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as DOE defendants 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that plaintiff's injuries as herein alleged were proximately caused by the acts and/or omissions of said fictitiously named defendants.
- 6. DOE defendants 1 through 10, and each of them, are and were at all times relevant hereto, employees, police officers, sergeants, investigators, and other police and civilian employees of the CITY OF FONTANA, whose duty it was to supervise the on-scene conduct of the other individual Defendants and/or approval of contents of police reports written by said Defendants, and who were acting within their capacity as employees, agents and servants of the defendant CITY OF FONTANA. DOES 1 through 10 are sued individually and in their capacity as officers, sergeants, captains, and other police officers for defendant CITY OF FONTANA.

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II. FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

7. On March 12, 2022 a fight broke out at 16600 Clubhouse Drive in the city of Fontana, California. During the fight, a firearm was possibly displayed by an unidentified person. Police were called. Defendants BRANDON NICELY, JACOB RAINEY, JOSEPH MORALES, BRANDON MCCAULLEY, JASON MEISTER, SAMUEL WOOTEN, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive responded to the location as the fight was ending and people were leaving.

- 8. Plaintiff and his girlfriend had attended a birthday party at the location. They had each exited the building because of the fight and had become separated in the confusion.
- 9. In the outside parking lot, Plaintiff's girlfriend began talking to one of the individual defendants who had responded to the scene. Plaintiff who was then approximately 60 feet away, and had been looking for his girlfriend, saw her and began walking in her direction. He held his hands away from his body, palms up. Defendants NICELY, MCCAULEY and other DOE defendants could see that he held no weapons in his hands.
- 10. Prior to any interaction with Plaintiff, one or more of the individual named and/or Doe Defendants had received information that the suspect who had possibly displayed the firearm was attempting to leave the scene in a grey-colored Mercedes. They had also been informed that the suspect was possibly a male. Beyond those characteristics—i.e., "male" and "driving a grey Mercedes"—he/they had no further description of the suspect who had brandished the firearm. Upon arrival on scene, one or more of the individual named and/or Doe Defendants observed a grey Mercedes slowly driving in the parking lot. Defendant WOOTEN and other members of the DEPARTMENT stopped the Mercedes and detained the driver.
- 11. While the Mercedes was stationary and its driver questioned, Defendant MCCAULEY began speaking to a female who told him a "guy in a white shirt" had attacked her nephew and was attacking women "right now". Defendant MCCAULEY knew that there were many men at the scene matching the description of "guy in a white shirt". The female pointed in the direction of a crowd of people. Defendant MCCAULEY then looked in that direction and did not see anyone "attacking women." The female then pointed at an individual in a white shirt.

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- 12. Defendant BRANDON NICELY detained the first male in a white shirt that came into his view. Defendant MCCAULEY immediately radioed Defendant NICELY to release the person hel had just detained and instead to grab Plaintiff—who happened to be the next male in a white shirt walking into Defendant NICELY's field of view. Defendant MCCAULEY issued this radio directive even though a bystander had told Defendant MCCAULEY "that's not the guy", referencing the Plaintiff.
- 13. Defendant NICELY approached Plaintiff from the side. He told Plaintiff to stop. Plaintiff who had done nothing wrong, told Defendant NICELY "my girlfriend's right there" and continued walking.
- 14. Defendant NICELY then ran up to Plaintiff and without any explanation grabbed Plaintiff by the wrist. Instinctively, Plaintiff attempted to pull his wrist free of Defendant Nicely's grip. He was not successful. Plaintiff did not push, punch, slap or even touch Defendant Nicely with his free hand.
- 15. Immediately upon seeing Defendant Nicely grab Plaintiff, other individual Defendants, including WOOTEN, MCCAULEY, RAINEY, and MEISTER ran up to Plaintiff. They tackled him to the ground while he was still being held by NICELY.
- 16. The fall caused Plaintiff to fracture his knee cap. While he was on the ground, defenseless and not resisting, one or more of the individual Doe and/or named defendants punched Plaintiff in the back of the head. Defendants MEISTER and RAINEY punched him repeatedly in the face, causing swelling and bruising. The named and DOE defendants piled on top of him as he lay prone on the ground, causing his left arm to become trapped under the combined weight of their bodies. Defendant MCCAULEY twisted Plaintiff's arm with the sole aim of causing him pain. The named and DOE defendants then yanked his arm out from underneath him and twisted it in such a way as to cause dislocation of his elbow. While they were doing all this, a Doe defendant stated "Do not pull away from the cops". Plaintiff yelled back "I'm not!".
- 17. Plaintiff was handcuffed. He cried out in obvious pain due to his broken kneecap and dislocated arm. He told one or more of the individual and/or Doe defendants that he could not walk. Despite Plaintiff's obvious injuries and complaints of pain, none of the defendants

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attempted to summon or provide any medical care to Plaintiff. Instead, they forced Plaintiff to walk on, and then bend, his already-injured knee and get into the back of a police car. Although they were fully aware that Plaintiff needed immediate medical care, Defendants MORALES, WOOTEN and/or Doe intentionally delay transporting him to the hospital and left him waiting in the parking lot of the locations for approximately 45 min. Defendants MORALES, WOOTEN and/or a DOE defendant eventually drove Plaintiff to a hospital, to receive treatment for his pain and injuries.

- 18. Plaintiff was then arrested and jailed for allegedly resisting a peace officer, a felony violation of California Penal Code Section 69(a).
- Defendant NICELY wrote that he had been told Plaintiff was possibly a suspect in a stabbing. This statement was deliberately false. No one, police officer or civilian, ever told Defendant NICELY that Plaintiff had stabbed anyone with, or even that he (Plaintiff) carried, a knife. Upon information and belief, shortly after Plaintiff had been placed in the back of the police car. Defendant NICELY made that same deliberately false statement to a DOE defendant who was on-scene supervisor.
- 20. In that same report, Defendant NICELY claimed that Plaintiff matched the description of a suspect in possession of a firearm. This statement was likewise false. In fact, the only description of the suspect in possession of the gun was that he was driving a grey Mercedes. There was no further physical description. Plaintiff was walking when Defendant NICELY detained him, and was nowhere near any Mercedes, grey or otherwise. Upon information and belief, shortly after Plaintiff had been placed in the back of the police car. Defendant NICELY made that same deliberately false statement to a DOE defendant who was on-scene supervisor.
- 21. Defendant MCCAULEY, in his report, claimed that he saw Plaintiff "ball up his fist" and "push" Defendant NICELY. MCCAULEY also claimed that Plaintiff was "swinging his fist" toward his (MCCAULEY's) body. All of these statements are deliberately false. Upon information and belief, shortly after Plaintiff had been placed in the back of the police car,

Defendant MCCAULEY made those same deliberately false statements to a DOE defendant who was on-scene supervisor.

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22. In his report, Defendant RAINEY claimed Plaintiff had tensed up and was attempting to keep his arms under his body. These statements are deliberately false. Plaintiff had no choice as to what to do with his arms. Several police officers were on top of his, and their combined weight prevented him from moving his arms. Upon information and belief, shortly after Plaintiff had been placed in the back of the police car, Defendant RAINEY made those same deliberately false statements to a DOE defendant who was on-scene supervisor.

- 23. Relying on the false statements, and without further investigation, a DOE defendant or defendants whose duty it was to act in a supervisory capacity and make an independent determination whether Plaintiff should be further detained or released, decided to formally arrest Plaintiff and transport him to jail.
- 24. On August 19, 2022, the San Bernardino County District attorney, acting on behalf of the State of California, filed a complaint charging Plaintiff in case MWV22012724 with a one-count violation of California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1), a misdemeanor. Upon information and belief, the District Attorney relied on the false statements in the reports when deciding whether to charge Plaintiff.
- 25. On August 23, 2022 Plaintiff made a demand for damages on all DEFENDANTS pursuant to California Tort Claims Act 810 et. seq. (hereinafter, the "CTCA claim")
 - 26. On August 31, 2022 Plaintiff entered a not guilty plea in the criminal case. Plaintiff's limitations period to bring a civil action for money damages was tolled during the pendency of this criminal case, see Gov. Code § 945.3.
- 24 27. On April 26, 2023, DEFENDANTS denied the CTCA claim.
 - 28. Plaintiff's criminal case was dismissed on November 7, 2023.
 - 29. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the CITY has a policy, custom, practice and pattern of conduct in place that enables its agents and employee police officers to act with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of individuals. This policy, custom,

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practice and pattern of conduct, includes, but is not limited to, tolerating misconduct by its police officers, and encouraging misconduct by failing to adequately supervise, discipline and train its police officers. Additionally, the custom, practice and pattern of conduct maintained by the CITY encourages its agents and employee police officers to punish individuals whom they perceive as defiant to the assertion of their authority by inflicting physical pain on such individuals.

30. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that CITY maintains a custom, policy, pattern, and practice of failing to exercise reasonable care in training, supervising and hiring its officers. Plaintiff further alleges that CITY maintains a custom, policy, pattern and practice of inaction regarding disciplining police officers for constitutional violations. Plaintiff also alleges that CITY has inadequate guidelines for conducting seizures of persons—i.e., detentions and arrests—the use of force necessary for arrests, officer demeanor, and use of de-escalation tactics. Plaintiff likewise alleges that CITY does not provide adequate training to its officers regarding the quantum and quality of information they need to possess before they may lawfully detain an individual. The CITY's policy, custom, practice and pattern were a motivating factor causing a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

III. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

42 U.S.C. § 1983

(UNLAWFUL SEIZURE)

- 31. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
- 32. "The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures by the government." *Gonzalez v. ICE*, 975 F.3d 788, 819 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). "The infringement on personal liberty of any 'seizure' of a person can only be 'reasonable' under the

Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess 'probable cause' before they seize him."

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968)). "Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person." *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).

33. As described in detail above in Section II (Facts Common to All Counts), Defendants, acting under color of state law, intentionally deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, by seizing, arresting, unreasonably taking into custody, and prolonging the detention of Plaintiff without cause and in violation of clearly established state and federal law. One or more of the DOE Defendants failed to perform his/their duty to appropriately supervise the named Defendants, and rather aided and abetted them in covering up the violations, knowingly approving their falsified reports for submission to the District Attorney's Office to

34. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' aforementioned acts, Plaintiff was injured as set forth above.

initiate prosecution against Plaintiff in order to shield Defendants from liability.

35. Individual defendants are personally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and not immune based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.

36. The CITY is liable pursuant to *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because the Fontana Police Department has a policy, practice, pattern, and/or custom of unlawfully condoning, permitting, and not sufficiently addressing its law enforcement officers' use of unlawful detention and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. This policy, practice, pattern, and/or custom is carried out with municipal funds and directly causally related to the deprivations of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by Defendants.

37. The CITY is separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable for this federal constitutional violation. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

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IV. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(EXCESSIVE FORCE)

38. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.

39. "Excessive use of force in effectuating a seizure violates the Fourth Amendment." *Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't*, 756 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989)).

40. As described in detail above in Section II (Facts Common to All Counts), Defendants, acting under color of state law, intentionally deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, by tackling him to the ground, collectively piling up on top of him, punching him many times in the back of the head, and dislocating his arm. One or more of the DOE Defendants failed to perform his/their duty to appropriately supervise the named Defendants, and rather aided and abetted them in covering up the violations, knowingly approving their falsified reports for submission to the District Attorney's Office to initiate prosecution against Plaintiff in order to shield Defendants from liability.

41. The CITY is liable pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because the Fontana Police Department has a policy, practice, pattern, and/or custom of unlawfully condoning, permitting, and not sufficiently addressing its law enforcement officers' use of unlawful detention and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. This policy, practice, pattern, and/or custom is carried out with municipal funds

and directly causally related to the deprivations of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by Defendants.

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42. The CITY is separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable for this federal constitutional violation. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

V. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(FALSE STATEMENTS AND FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE)

- 43. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
- 44. "[T]here is a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government." *Devereaux v. Abbey,* 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001).
- 45. As described in detail above in Section II (Facts Common to All Counts), Defendants, acting under color of state law, intentionally deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, by making the many false statements against Plaintiff including, but not limited to, that he was suspected in a stabbing, and of carrying a concealed firearm, and that he "balled up his fist" at, and swung toward, an officer. The false statements caused the unlawful imprisonment of, and the bringing of criminal charges against, Plaintiff. One or more of the DOE Defendants failed to perform his/their duty to appropriately supervise the named Defendants, and rather aided and abetted them in covering up the violations, knowingly

approving their falsified reports for submission to the District Attorney's Office to initiate prosecution against Plaintiff in order to shield Defendants from liability.

46. The CITY is liable pursuant to *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because the Fontana Police Department has a policy, practice, pattern, and/or custom of condoning, permitting, and not sufficiently addressing its law enforcement officers' use of unlawful detention and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The policy, practice, pattern and/or custom in turn encourages the law enforcement officers to make false statements in order to cover up the unlawful detention of, and use of excessive force against, members of the public. This policy, practice, pattern, and/or custom is carried out with municipal funds and directly causally related to the deprivations of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by Defendants.

47. The CITY is separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable for this federal constitutional violation. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

VI. FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DENIAL OF MEDICAL CARE)

48. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.

49. The Fourteenth Amendment is violated if state officials are deliberately indifferent to a pretrial detainee's serious medical needs. *Rife v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 854 F.3d 637, 647 (10th Cir. 2017, internal citations omitted)

50. As described in detail above in Section II (Facts Common to All Counts), Defendants, acting under color of state law, intentionally deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities

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secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, by intentionally or recklessly denying medical care to Plaintiff while he was confined in the back of the police cruiser.

51. As a result, Plaintiff was subjected to extreme and unnecessary physical and mental pain and suffering while he waited for medical assistance.

52. The named and DOE Defendants knew that failure to provide timely medical treatment to Plaintiff could result in further injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, but disregarded that serious medical need, causing Plaintiff mental and physical suffering.

53. The CITY is liable pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because the Fontana Police Department has a policy, practice, pattern, and/or custom of condoning, permitting, and not sufficiently addressing its law enforcement officers' use of unlawful detention and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The policy, practice, pattern and/or custom in turn encourages the law enforcement officers to purposefully delay medical care to members of the public injured during the use of unlawful detentions and excessive force. This policy, practice, pattern, and/or custom is carried out with municipal funds and directly causally related to the deprivations of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by Defendants.

54. The CITY is separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable for this federal constitutional violation. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

VI. FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (TOM BANE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT)

55. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.

56. The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act provides for liability when a defendant's threats,
intimidation, or coercion interferes or attempts to interfere with "the exercise or enjoyment by
any individual of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights
secured by the Constitution or laws of this state." Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a).

- 57. As described in detail above in Section II (Facts Common to All Counts), Defendants, acting under color of state law, engaged in threats, intimidation, or coercive acts that interfered with or attempted to interfere with the rights of Plaintiffs secured under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and Sections 7 and 13 of Article I of the California Constitution. Defendant DOE failed to perform his duty to appropriately supervise the other named and/or DOE defendants, and rather aided and abetted them in covering up the violations, knowingly approving their falsified reports for submission to the District Attorney's Office to initiate prosecution against Plaintiff in order to shield Defendants from liability.
- 58. Defendants unlawfully took Plaintiff into custody and imprisoned and detained him without probable cause for an unreasonably lengthy period, with the particular purpose of depriving Plaintiff of the protections afforded under the U.S. and California Constitutions and state law.
- 59. Defendants additionally unlawfully applied excessive force against Plaintiff with the particular purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of the protections afforded him under the U.S. and California Constitutions and state law.
- 60. Defendants also fabricated evidence against Plaintiff in an attempt to have him falsely charged, with the particular purpose of depriving him of the protections afforded under the U.S. and California Constitutions and state law.
- 61. Defendants' deliberate and reckless actions caused Plaintiff to suffer significant harm.
- 62. Individual defendants are personally liable under the Bane Civil Rights Act.
- 63. The CITY is separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable under the Bane Act. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

VII. FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

64. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 65. "False imprisonment involves the intentional confinement of another against the person's will. The elements are (1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief." Bocanegra v. Jakubowski, 241 Cal. App. 4th 848, 854 (2015) (citations omitted). 66. As described in detail above in Section II (Facts Common to All Counts), Defendants, acting under color of state law, intentionally, recklessly, and negligently took and held Plaintiff in custody and confined him against his will for an appreciable period of time, even though they had no privilege to do so, and constitutional and state statutory law explicitly prohibited Defendants from doing so. See U.S. Const., amend. IV and XIV; Cal. Const., art. 1, §§ 7 and 13. DOE defendants failed to perform their duty to appropriately supervise other named and/or DOE defendants, and rather aided and abetted them in covering up the violations, knowingly approving their falsified reports for submission to the District Attorney's Office to initiate

67. Individual defendants are personally liable for false imprisonment.

prosecution against Plaintiff in order to shield Defendants from liability.

68. The CITY is separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable for this state law violation. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

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VIII. SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF ASSAULT AND BATTERY

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69. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim

each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.

70. "The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant's conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm." *So v. Shin*, 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-69 (2013).

71. "The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant's conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would have been offended by the touching." Id. at 669.

72. As described in detail above in Section II (Facts Common to All Counts), Defendants, acting under color of state law, intentionally, recklessly, and negligently, and with the intent to harm Plaintiff, tackled and beat him, placed Plaintiff in handcuffs, took Plaintiff into custody and confined him against his will, even though constitutional and state statutory law explicitly prohibited Defendants from doing so. See U.S. Const., amend. IV and XIV; Cal. Const., art. 1, §§ 7 and 13. Defendant DOE failed to perform his duty to appropriately supervise the other individual defendants, and rather aided and abetted them in covering up the violations, knowingly approving their falsified reports for submission to the District Attorney's Office to initiate prosecution against Plaintiff in order to shield Defendants from liability.

- 73. Plaintiff did not consent to Defendants' offensive conduct and reasonably believed that they were going to be harmed and were harmed, as any reasonable person in Plaintiffs' position would have been.
- 74. Defendants' offensive conduct directly and proximately injured Plaintiff.
- 75. Individual defendants NICELY, MCCAULEY, and RAINEY are personally liable for assault and battery.

76. The CITY is separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable for this state law violation. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

VIII. SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

77. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.

78. "A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." *Hughes v. Pair*, 46 Cal.4th 1035,1050-1051 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

79. As described in detail above in Section II (Facts Common to All Counts), Defendants, acting under color of state law, intentionally, recklessly, and negligently, and with the intent to harm Plaintiff, tackled and beat him, placed Plaintiff in handcuffs, took Plaintiff into custody and falsely imprisoned him, even though constitutional and state statutory law explicitly prohibited Defendants from doing so. See U.S. Const., amend. IV and XIV; Cal. Const., art. 1, §§ 7 and 13. Defendant DOE failed to perform his duty to appropriately supervise the other individual defendants, and rather aided and abetted them in covering up the violations, knowingly approving their falsified reports for submission to the District Attorney's Office to initiate prosecution against Plaintiff in order to shield Defendants from liability.

80. Defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous and was done with the intention of causing, or in reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress to Plaintiff. Defendants' conduct was carried out in direct violation of constitutional and statutory law and in a willful

abuse of power; it was intended to cause extreme injury to Plaintiff with the realization that it would do so. Defendants' conduct was so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.

- 81. Plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress and injury as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' outrageous conduct.
- 82. Defendants' offensive conduct directly and proximately injured Plaintiff.
- 83. Individual defendants NICELY, RAINEY, MCCAULEY, MEISTER and the DOE defendants are personally liable for assault and battery.
- 84. The CITY is separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable for this state law violation. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

IX. EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF NEGLIGENCE

- 85. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief against all Defendants, who aided and abetted one another in the acts alleged in this claim, and realleges and incorporates by reference in this claim each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
- 86. At all times relevant to this complaint, DOE defendants had a duty to supervise the named Defendants NICELY, MEISTER, RAINEY and MCCAULEY.
- 87. As described above in Section II ("Facts Common to All Causes of Action"), the named and DOE defendants unlawfully seized Plaintiff, used excessive force against him and intentionally committed violence and intimidation against him not for any legitimate crime-prevention or investigative purpose, but solely to prevent him from exercising rights secured to him by the United States and California Constitutions. Additionally, the named and Doe Defendants delayed medical care to Plaintiff when it was apparent to any reasonable person that he was injured and in pain. Finally, they fabricated evidence against Plaintiff in order to imprison him and to cause the filing of a criminal case against him. At a minimum, the named and DOE defendants acted

- 88. Upon information and belief, the individual named and/or DOE defendants who tackled and beat Plaintiff were supervised by a DOE defendant at the scene. Later, a DOE defendant approved the reports containing deliberately false information about Plaintiff's conduct and the circumstances in which he was tackled and beaten. These DOE defendants summarily approved and/or ratified the conduct and false statements of the named and/or DOE Defendants without undertaking any reasonable investigation to determine the veracity of their claims against Plaintiff.
- 89. The DOE Defendant or Defendants who was/were the on-scene supervisor/s and who approved the false reports are personally liable for negligence.
- 90. The CITY is directly liable for its negligence, and separately vicariously liable under state law, because its employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, are liable for this state law violation. Cal. Gov. Code 815.2

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

- WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing claims, Plaintiffs pray that the Court grant judgment against Defendants as follows:
- 1. General and compensatory damages in an amount according to proof;
- 2. Special damages according to proof;
- 3. Injunctive relief;

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- 4. Costs, restitution, and multiple damages according to proof;
- 5. Punitive and exemplary damages according to proof;
- 6. Any and all applicable statutory and civil penalties;
- 7. Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded;
 - 8. An award of attorneys' fees and costs, when permitted by law;
- 9. Leave to amend this Complaint to conform to the evidence produced in discovery and at trial; and
 - 10. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

	Case 2:24-cv-03460	Document 1	Filed 04/26/24	Page 24 of 36	Page ID #:24	
	Disintiff hander damen de	in mu tain 1 of all in				
1 2	Plaintiff hereby demands	jury trial of all is	sues so triable.			
3	DATE: 03/04/2024		В	y: pill	(M)	
4				lichael J. Munoz, E	Esq.	
5				Iunoz and Munoz,	•	
6			A	ttorneys for Plainti	iff	
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EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT C

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

ARIEL ALEXANDER SANCHEZ	Case No.: CIV SB 2 4 0 2 2 1 9			
VS.	CERTIFICATE OF ASSIGNMENT			
CITY OF FONTANA, ET AL.				
A civil action or proceeding present is the residence of a party, name	nted for filing must be accompanied by this Certificate. If the ground and residence shall be stated.			
	e above-entitled matter is filed for proceedings in the			
	District of the Superior Court under Rule131 and General Order			
of this court for the checked reaso	·			
✓ General	Collection			
Nature of Action	Ground			
1. Adoption	Petitioner resides within the district .			
2. Conservator	Petitioner or conservatee resides within the district.			
3. Contract	Performance in the district is expressly provided for.			
4. Equity	The cause of action arose within the district.			
5. Eminent Domain	The property is located within the district.			
6. Family Law	Plaintiff, defendant, petitioner or respondent resides within the district.			
7. Guardianship	Petitioner or ward resides within the district or has property within the district.			
8. Harassment	Plaintiff, defendant, petitioner or respondent resides within the district.			
9. Mandate	The defendant functions wholly within the district.			
10. Name Change	The petitioner resides within the district.			
11. Personal Injury	The injury occurred within the district.			
12. Personal Property	The property is located within the district.			
13. Probate	Decedent resided or resides within or had property within the district.			
14. Prohibition	The defendant functions wholly within the district.			
15. Review	The defendant functions wholly within the district.			
16. Title to Real Property	The property is located within the district.			
17. Transferred Action	The lower court is located within the district.			
18. Unlawful Detainer	The property is located within the district.			
19. Domestic Violence	The petitioner, defendant, plaintiff or respondent resides within the district.			
20. Other Civil Rights	The cause of action arose within the district			
21. THIS FILING WOULD	NORMALLY FALL WITHIN JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURT			
The address of the accident, perform case for filing in the above-designed	ance, party, detention, place of business, or other factor which qualifies this district is:			
The cause of action arose within the dis	strict 16600 Clubhouse Drive			
thing indicate many and an array of the second seco				
Fontana	CA 92336			
CITY	STATE ZIP CODE			
I declare, under penalty of perjury	, that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was			
executed on 03/04/2024	at Azusa ,			
California.				
Camorina.				
	sill su			
	Signature of Attorney/Party			



SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

San Bernardino District 247 West 3rd St San Bernardino CA 92415 www.sb-court.org 909-708-8678

Sanchez -v- City of Fontana et al	
	Case Number
IOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE and NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT	CIVSB2402219

Munoz & Munoz, Attorneys at Law 232 E Foothill Blvd Suite 201 Azusa CA 91702

This case has been assigned to: David E Driscoll in Department S22 - SBJC for all purposes.

Notice is hereby given that the above-entitled case has been set for Trial Setting Conference on:

Hearing Date: 09/09/2024 at 8:30 AM in Department S22 - SBJC

Date	: 3/8/2024	Ву:	Stephanie Garcia, Deputy Clerk
	CERTIFICATE O		
not a	a Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court for the County of a party to this action and on the date and place shown Enclosed in a sealed envelope mailed to the interested this date, following standard Court practices. Enclosed in a sealed envelope, first class postage promailed to the interested party and addressed as show A copy of this notice was given to the filling party at the A copy of this notice was placed in the bin located at law firm's collection of file-stamped documents.	belowed part epaid vn abo e cou	in the U.S. mail at the location shown above, love or as shown on the attached listing.
	clare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true anardino, CA.	and co By:	4
			Stephanie Garcia, Deputy Clerk

		CM-010			
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): MICHAEL J. MUNOZ 266692 MUNOZ & MUNOZ					
232 EAST FOOTHILL BOULEVARD, SUITE 20 TELEPHONE NO.: 626-334-8405 FA EMAIL ADDRESS: MMUNOZ@MUNOZLAWYERS.C ATTORNEY FOR (Name): ARIEL ALEXANDER SANCH	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO SAN BERNARDINO DISTRICT				
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF		MAR 08 2024			
STREET ADDRESS: 247 West Third Street MAILING ADDRESS: 247 West Third Street		6			
CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Bernardino 92415-0210 BRANCH NAME: SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE O	CENTER/CIVIL DIVISION	BY Stephanie Garcla, Deputy			
CASE NAME: SANCHEZ v. CITY OF FONTANA, ET AL.	,				
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET	Complex Case Designation	CATINATECED 2 4 0 2 2 1 0			
✓ Unlimited Limited	Counter Joinder	CIV SB 2402219			
(Amount (Amount	Filed with first appearance by defendant				
demanded demanded is	(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402)				
exceeds \$35,000) \$35,000 or less)	A STATE OF S	DEPT.:			
	ow must be completed (see instructions of	n page 2).			
Check one box below for the case type that		Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation			
Auto Tort	Contract	(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400–3.403)			
Auto (22)	Breach of contract/warranty (06)	Antitrust/Trade regulation (03)			
Uninsured motorist (46) Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Property	Rule 3.740 collections (09)	Construction defect (10)			
Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort	Other collections (09)	Mass tort (40)			
Asbestos (04)	Insurance coverage (18)	Securities litigation (28)			
Product liability (24)	Other contract (37)	Environmental/Toxic tort (30)			
Medical malpractice (45)	Real Property	Insurance coverage claims arising from the			
Other PI/PD/WD (23)	Eminent domain/Inverse condemnation (14)	above listed provisionally complex case			
	Wrongful eviction (33)	types (41)			
Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort		Enforcement of Judgment			
Business tort/unfair business practice (07)	Unlawful Detainer	Enforcement of judgment (20)			
Civil rights (08)	Commercial (31)	Miscellaneous Civil Complaint			
Defamation (13)	Residential (32)	RICO (27)			
Fraud (16)	Drugs (38)	Other complaint (not specified above) (42)			
Intellectual property (19)	Judicial Review	Miscellaneous Civil Petition			
Professional negligence (25)	Asset forfeiture (05)	Partnership and corporate governance (21)			
Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (35)	Petition re: arbitration award (11)	Other petition (not specified above) (43)			
Employment	Writ of mandate (02)				
Wrongful termination (36) Other employment (15)	Other judicial review (39)				
		les of Court. If the case is complex, mark the			
 This case is is is not comfactors requiring exceptional judicial management. 	rement				
I of an artaly conta		r of witnesses			
	e. Coordination	with related actions pending in one or more			
b. Extensive motion practice raising of issues that will be time-consuming	to resolve	er counties, states, or countries, or in a federal			
c. Substantial amount of documentar	Court	ostjudgment judicial supervision			
3. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a.		declaratory or injunctive relief c. punitive			
Number of causes of action (specify): Eigh	o. Nomedia badgin (street at a set apply)				
	ass action suit.				
0. 11110 0000	This case 1				
Date: 03/04/2024					
MICHAEL J. MUNOZ					
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY)					
NOTICE Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed					
Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first parameter the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfall	re and Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court,	rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result in sanctions.			
File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet	et required by local court rule.				
 If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of 	the California Rules of Court, you must serve	a copy of this cover sheet on all other parties to			
 the action or proceeding. Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 	or a complex case, this cover sheet will be us	ed for statistical purposes only. Page 1 of 2			
Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740	or a complex case, and cover sheet will be de	1 mg 1 VI k			

NAM	ME AND ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTOR	INEY	STATE BAR NUMBER	Reserved for Clerk's File Stamp	
E-I AT	ELEPHONE NO.: MAIL ADDRESS: TORNEY FOR (Name): X NO. (Optional):	TRIAL SETTING CONFE UNLIMITED CASE:	RENCE DATE:		
	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIF DURTHOUSE ADDRESS:	ORNIA, COUNTY	OF SAN BERNARDINO		
PL	AINTIFF:				
DE	FENDANT:				
	INITIAL TRIAL SETTI	NG CONFEREN	CE STATEMENT	CASE NUMBER:	
	TRUCTIONS: All applicable boxes st be filed and served at least 15 da			st be provided. <u>This document</u>	
1.	Party or parties (answer one): a.		(names):		
2.	Service of Complaint on all parties	has ☐ has not ☐	been completed.		
3.	Service of Cross-Complaint on all	parties has 🔲 has n	ot been completed.		
4.	Description of case in Complaint:				
5.	Description of case in Cross-Comp	laint:			
6.	. Has all discovery been completed: Yes 🔲 No 🔲 Date discovery anticipated to be completed:				
7.	Do you agree to mediation? Yes No Please check type agreed to: Private: Court-sponsored:				
8.	Related cases, consolidation, and	coordination: Please	e attach a Notice of Related Case.		
	☐ A motion to ☐ consolidate ☐ Trial dates requested: Yes ☐ No ☐ Available dates:				
9.	Other issues: The following additional matters a	are requested to be co	nsidered by the Court:		
10.	 Meet and Confer: The parties represent that they have met and conferred on all subjects required by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.724. 				
	☐ The parties have entered into the following stipulation(s):				
11.	Total number of pages attached (if a	ny):			
	I am completely familiar with this case and will be fully prepared to discuss the status of discovery and alternative dispute resolution, as well as other issues raised by this statement, and will possess the authority to enter into stipulations on these issues at the time of the Initial Trial Setting Conference, including the written authority of the party where required. Date:				
	(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)		(SIGNATURE OF PA	RTY OR ATTORNEY	
	(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)		(SIGNATURE OF PA	RTY OR ATTORNEY	
NAM	ME AND ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTOR	INEY	STATE BAR NUMBER	Reserved for Clerk's File Stamp	

E-N	LEPHONE NO.: MAIL ADDRESS: TORNEY FOR (Name): X NO. (Optional):	TRIAL SETTING CONFIUNLIMITED CASE:	ERENCE DATE:			
	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIF DURTHOUSE ADDRESS:	ORNIA, COUNT	Y OF SAN BERNAF	RDINO		
	AINTIFF:					
DE	FENDANT:	NC CONFEDEN	ICE STATEMENT		CASE NUMBER:	_
	INITIAL TRIAL SETTI	NG CONFEREN	ICE STATEMENT			_
	TRUCTIONS: All applicable boxes st be filed and served at least 15 da				be provided. This document	
	Party or parties (answer one): a.	itted by party (<i>name)</i> :				
2.	Service of Complaint on all parties	has has not	been completed.			
3.	Service of Cross-Complaint on all	parties has 🔲 has	not 🗌 been completed	d.		
4.	Description of case in Complaint:					
5.	Description of case in Cross-Comp	laint:				
6.	Has all discovery been completed: \					
7.	Do you agree to mediation? Yes] No ☐ Please o	heck type agreed to: Pr	rivate:	Court-sponsored:	
8.	Related cases, consolidation, and	coordination: Pleas	se attach a Notice of Rel	ated Case.		
	☐ A motion to ☐ consolidate Time estimate:	☐ Trial dates reque	ested: Yes 🗌 No 🗍	Available o	dates:	
9.	Other issues: The following additional matters a	are requested to be co	onsidered by the Court:			
10.	Meet and Confer: ☐ The parties represent that they h	ave met and conferre	ed on all subjects require	d by Californ	ia Rules of Court, Rule 3.724.	
	☐ The parties have entered into the	e following stipulation	(s):			
11.	Total number of pages attached (if a	ny):				
	I am completely familiar with this cas resolution, as well as other issues ra issues at the time of the Initial Trial S Date:	ised by this statemen	t, and will possess the a	uthority to er	iter into stipulations on these	
	(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)		(SIGNATU	RE OF PAR	TY OR ATTORNEY	
	(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)		(SIGNATU	IRE OF PAR	TY OR ATTORNEY	

EXHIBIT D

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1	James R. Touchstone, SBN 184584 jrt@jones-mayer.com			
2	Denise L. Rocawich, SBN 232792			
3	dlr@jones-mayer.com Danielle J. Williams, SBN 317229			
4	djw@jones-mayer.com			
5	JONES MAYER 3777 N. Harbor Blvd.			
6	Fullerton, CA 92835 Telephone: (714) 446-1400			
7	Facsimile: (714) 446-1448			
8				
9	Attorneys for Defendants, CITY OF FONTANA, BRANDON NICELY	V IACOR RAINEV IOSEPH MORALES		
10	BRANDON MCCAULLEY, JASON MEISTER			
11				
12	SUPERIOR COURT OF THI	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
13	COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO			
14				
15	ARIEL ALEXANDER SANCHEZ,	Case No: CIV SB 2402219		
16	,			
	Plaintiff,			
17	V.	NOTICE TO STATE COURT AND ADVERSE PARTY OF REMOVAL OF		
18		ACTION TO FEDERAL COURT		
19	CITY OF FONTANA, BRANDON NICELY, JACOB RAINEY, JOSEPH			
20	MORALES, BRANDON MCCAULLEY, JASON MEISTER, SAMUEL WOOTEN,			
21	and DOES 1-10 inclusive,			
22	Defendants.			
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